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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(h).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the district court err in essentially ruling that, as a matter oflaw, a

landlord that owns real property on which a tenant's cows are grazing is "in
possession or control" of the livestock for purposes of Utah Code Annotated §4 l6a-407( 1)(a)?
Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, In_c., 99 P.3d 801,813 (Utah 2004).
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, iJl 7; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7.
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: The appellant preserved this issue for
appeal in its motion for summary judgment, R. 385-97, and in its motion for a
directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17, and 167:25 to 169:9.
2.

Did the district court err in its legal ruling that, even though the

evidence was insufficient to pierce the corporate veil, a relaxed standard applied
and the defendant owed a greater duty?

1
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· Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004).
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal
conclusions are reviewed. for correctness, including its application of law to the
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, ,Il 7; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7.
· Preservation of Issue for Appeal: The appellant preserved this issue for
appeal ~n its motion for summary j~dgment, R. R. 3 85-97, and in its motion for a
directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17,'and 167:25 to 169:9.

3.

Was the jury's verdict in this case fatally inconsistent with itself?

Standard of Review: This is a legal issue that is reviewed by the appellate
court de novo. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801,813 (Utah 2004).
"While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the
facts of the case. State v. Fuller, 2104 UT 29, ,r17; 764 Utah Adv. Rep. 7.
Preservation of Issue for ·Appeal: The appellant raised the legal arguments
upon which it now relies in its motion for summary judgment, 385-97, and in its
motion for a directed verdict, R. 1142 at 161 :9 to 164:17, and 167:25 to 169:9.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-407(1)(a) provides:
A person who owns or is in possession or control of any _livestock
ma~ not willfully or n_egligently permit any of the livestock to stray or
2
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remain unaccompanied on a highway if both sides of the highway are
separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk,
curb, lawn, or building.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and Disposition in the
Trial Court

This case involves a claim made by the plaintiff, Patrick Liley ("Liley"),
against Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. ("Cedar Springs"), and other parties. Liley
alleges that he sustained injuries when he struck a cow that had entered Utah's
Highway 28 in Juab County. Cedar Springs moved for summary judgment and
established that it did not own the cow that was hit by Liley (or any cows for that
matter). Cedar Springs also argued that, as a matter of law, Cedar Springs did not
have a duty to maintain fences along Highway 28.
On the first day of the trial, the district court denied Cedar Springs' motion
for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. See District Court Docket,
Minute Entry dated 3-3-15 and entitled "Minutes for Jury Trial." 1 Cedar Springs
then ·renewed its legal arguments in a motion for directed verdict, which the district
court also denied. R. 1142 at 161:9 to 164:17, 167:25 to 169:9, and 169:10 to
170: 12. Although the district court recognized that Cedar Springs did not own the
cow and was not in possession of property near the hig~way, the district court

1

The docket sheet is included as part of the record, but it is not paginated.
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·(i;i·

ruled that there was a "close.interrelationship" between Cedar Springs and its
tenant. R. 1142 at 170:1-2. While the district court ruled that it was not piercing
the corporate veil, it nevertheless held that a greater duty existed because of the
relationship between the companies. Id.
The jury returned a verdict against Cedar Springs, and the district court
entered judgment against Cedar Springs on March 20, 2015. R. 801-803. Cedar
Springs filed a timely notice of appeal on April 2, 2015. R. 846-47.
Statement of Facts

1.

At 2:00 a.m. on October 4, 2009, Patrick Liley was travelling north on

Highway 28 in Juab County when he hit and killed a cow. R. 1142 at 82:24 to
83:3; R. 864 at 118:16-22.
2.

It is undisputed that Cedar Springs did not own the cow that Liley hit

and killed. Indeed, it is undisputed that Cedar Springs has never owned any cows.
R. 390.

3.

Cedar Springs owned land on the east side of the highway near where

the accident occurred. Id.
4.

Cedar Springs leased the property to an entity called Warm Creek

Ranch, Inc. ("Warm Creek"). Id.
5.

Under the lease _agreement between Cedar Springs and Warm Creek,

Warm Creek was responsible to maintain the fences on the property. Id.
. 4
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6.

The jury found that Wann Creek (the tenant) was _not at fault, R. 788,

and that the percentage of the fault that caused Liley' s harm was 0% attributable to

Warm Creek, R. 789.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in not granting Cedar Springs' motion for summary
judgment and in then allowing the jury to decide issues of law. As a matter of law,
Cedar Springs did not owe a duty to Liley in this case, and Liley sued the wrong
party~

2

ARGUMENT
In his First Amended Complaint, Liley alleged just one cause of action
against Cedar Springs. That claim was for negligence. In order to establish
negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed it a duty. In this case, as
a matter of law, there are only three possible legal bases upon which Cedar Springs
could have owed a duty to Liley.
The first possible basis for a duty is Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-407 ( 1)(a),
which applies to "[a] person who owns or is in possession or control of any
livestock." As shown below, Cedar Springs did not own the cow that Liley hit and
killed. Indeed, Cedar Springs has never owned or controlled any livestock.

2

For some reason, Liley did not sue Warm Creek, and although the jury was asked
to apportion fault, Warm Creek was never a defendant in the case.
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A second possible basis for a .legal duty is Cedar Spring' s status as a
landlord (the theory being that a landlord is in "control" of its tenant's livestock).
However, as shown below, the Utah Supreme Court has held that it is the duty of a
tenant, not a landlord, to keep premises safe.
Finally, although not relied upon by Liley, it is conceivable that the doctrine
of respondeat superior cou~d provide some sort of a basis for a duty on the part of
. Cedar Springs. However, the jury found that the tenant was 0% at fault here, and,
as matter of law, if a tenant is not negligent,. its landlord can have no liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Stated differently, while it is conceivable that
Cedar Springs could have been negligent in super.vising Warm Creek, the jury
found that Warm Creek was 0% at fault for the accident. Therefore, there is
nothing for the landlord to answer for. Accordingly, the jury's verdict is internally
inconsistent, and it cannot be sustained.

I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, SECTION 41-6a-407(1)(a) DID NOT
IMPOSE A DUTY ON CEDAR SPRINGS AS LANDLORD.

Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-407{l)(a) provides:
A person who owns or is in possession or control of any livestock
may not willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or
remain unaccompanied on a highway if both sides of the highway are
separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk,
curb, lawn, or building.
As a matter of law, Cedar Springs did not own, possess, or control any livestock.
The district court therefore erred in denying Cedar Springs' motion for summary
6
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judgment, as well as its motion for a directed verdict. The district court then
compounded this error by allowing the jury to decide the meaning of the statute.

It was undisputed on summary judgment, that Cedar Springs did not own the
cow that Liley hit. Indeed, it is undisputed that Cedar Springs has never owned
any livestock. N~ne of these facts were disputed at trial.
Further, as pointed out in Cedar Springs' motion for summary judgment; the
Utah Supreme Court has held that a landlord "is not deemed to be the principal of
his tenant merely because of the landlord-tenant relationship." Stephenson v.
Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the court held that a
landlord is "not responsible for the tenant's torts, nor for the tenant's failure to
keep the premises reasonably safe and in good repair." Id. The supreme court
stated: "On the contrary, ... it is the tenant who is responsible for any dangerous
condition on the premises which he creates or permits to come into existence- after
he has taken possession." Id. at 586-69. Thus, as a matter of law, Cedar Springs is
not liable to Liley for its tenant's failure (if any) to "keep the premises ... in good
repair." This would apply to the fences on the property. The district court
therefore erred in denying the motion for summary judgment.
The district court's error was then compounded when the court allowed the
jury to decide issues of law regarding what constitutes "control" under section 416a-407 (1 )(a). Liley's counsel was permitted to tell the jury, "the rule is if you're in
7
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control of livestock means it's in your property." R. 864 at 94:8-9 (emphasis
added). Contrary to the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Stephenson, Liley's
counsel was allowed to further tell the jury that "[t]he owner-of the property _is
responsible to make sure that they take reasonable care ih maintaining_ their
fences." R. 864 at 94:25 to 95:2.
Defense counsel objected to the foregoing statements to the jury, stating:
"Object, Your Honor. He's arguing the law, and it's a complete misstatement of
the law, Your Honor." R. 864 at 97:4-6. The Court overruled the objection. R.
864 at. 97 :7-10. The effect of this ruling was to allow the jury-and not the
court-to interpret the statute based upon the arguments of counsel. This was
error.
After the court overruled defense counsel's objection, Liley's counsel
continued to tell the jury how th:~ statute must be interpreted. For example, Liley's
counsel told the jury that the law imposes a non-delegable duty on a landlord. R.
864 at 97:13-20. He also told the jury in his closing argument: "[T]he safety law
in the state says it's their responsibility. It wasn't Warm Creek's [the tenant]." R.
- 1453 at 42: 18-20. Counsei further instructed the jury as follows: "What
percentage belongs to Warm Creek? Zero. Why. I told you what the safety law
says." R. 1453 at 45:17-19. In other words, Liley did not argue that Cedar Springs
was liable based upon some factual issues regarding Cedar Springs' failure to
8.
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supervise its tenant. Rather, Liley' s argument was a legal one. Liley' s counsel
was very plain: "Our claims are against Cedar Springs because it was their
property, and the cows were on their property, and the safety law in the state says
it's the~r responsibility." R. 1453 at 42:16-20. This argument demonstrates that
this case was decided based upon a legal issue. And legal issues should have been
decided by the court. Under the supreme court's ruling in Stephenson, the district
court erred in allowing the jury to decide that-as a matter of law-a landlord
"controls" livestock owned by its tenant. Furthermore, this court reviews legal
issues de novo, so the jury's determination on this particular point is not entitled to
any deference.
Furthermore, the problem in this case was compounded in a significant and
prejudic~al way when Liley's counsel informed the jury that "[i]fyou award any
percentage of fault to Warm Creek, Patrick Liley can't be compensated for that."
R. 1453 at 42:2-4. It is unclear why Liley chose not to sue Warm Creek, but it was
his decision, not Cedar Springs'. More importantly, counsel's comment _likely led
the jury to believe that underthe so-called "safety statute," Cedar Springs was
liable and that apportioning fault to Warm Creek would deprive Liley of a
recovery.
Of course, as stated above, Liley could have presented factual evidence
regarding the relationship between Cedar Springs and its tenant. But there was no
9
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such evidence presented. Instead Liley relied on legal arguments, telling (actually,
instructing) the jury what the Word "possession" in.the statute means: Counsel
stated: "Possession is the cows are on their property." R. 145~ at 35:23-24
(emphasis added). Counsel continued, "Well, it's your responsibility, Cedar
Springs, it's your.property, and you have cows on the property. That's what the
law says." R. 1453 at 36:16-19.
Based upon the foregoing, the jury was left with the impression that section
41-6a-407 ( 1)(a) is a strict liability statute for landlords and that ownership of real
property is enough to impose per se liability under section 41-6a-407{l)(a).
However, this is not what the statute says. If the legislature had wanted to base the
duty under section 41-6a-407(1)(a) on ownership of real property, it could have
easily done so. But it did not. Rather, the legislature based the duty on
"possession or control of ... livestock." The district court erred in not interpreting
the law itself, in not ruling that based on the undisputed facts Cedar Springs was
not in possession or control of any livestock, and then in allowing the jury to
decide what the statute means.
The district court based its approach on the notion that Cedar Springs and
Warm Creek are related corporations. This too was error.· The district court
aclmowledged. that there was not sufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil,
but the court decided to bend the rules because of the close relationship between

10
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Cedar Springs an~ Warm Creek. However, the district court should have simply
decided what section 41-6a-407( 1)(a) means. The statute cannot mean one thing in
one context and another thing in situations in which corporations are related. The
statute should be interpreted and ~pplied uniformly. That is the essence of due
process. If Warm Creek and Cedar Springs were not entitled to be treated as
separate legal entities, then the court should have so held. But if they are separate
entities they are entitled to be treated as such under Stephenson and under section
41-6a-407{l)(a).

II.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT CEDAR SPRINGS
OWED OR ASSUMED ANY DUTY OTHER THAN IN ITS
CAPA CITY AS LANDLORD.

A second possible basis for finding that Cedar Springs ~we~ a l_egal duty to
Liley might be based on evidence at trial that Cedar Springs assumed some sort of
duty to maintain the fences. However, it is undisputed that under the lease
agreement between Cedar Springs and Warm Creek, it was Warm Creek's duty to
maintain the fences. There was no factual evidence regarding any other duty or
any failure to supervise.

III.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, CEDAR SPRINGS COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT WARM CREEK
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.

Finally, it might be possible to argue that Cedar Springs was required to
answer for the negligence of its tenant under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
11
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However, such an argument would be inappropriate here because Warm Creek (the
owner of the livestock) was not negligent. As stated above, the jury specifically
found that Warm Creek was 0% responsible for Liley' s injuries in this case. If
Warm Creek was not liable for failing to maintain fences, then, as a matter of law,
there is• no negligence for the superior party to answer for. If, for example, a jury
finds that a pizza delivery person is not responsible for causing an automobile
~-

accident, then there is no basis in the law for holding the owner of the pizza
company liable for any damages. Thus, the jury's verdict in this case is internally
inconsistent, and it cannot be sustained. It cannot be said that the tenant was 0%
responsible but that the landlord should nevertheless answer for the tenant's
alleged failure to maintain the fences. If Warm Creek was not a fault in any way,
then there was no actionable failure to maintain fences.

CONCLUSION
Based on the fore going reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of
the district court.

DATED this· 3 rd day of March, 2016.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for Appellant
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CASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury
Disclosures
vjj

02-12-15 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service:

Certificate of Service

of Subpoena
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-12-15 Judge JENNIFER A BROWN assigned.
02-17-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon JEAN DAVID VIGOS for
Party Served: PATRICK LILEY

'vJ

Service Type: Personal
Service Date: February 12, 2015
02-17-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-18-15 Filed: Subpoena to Dale Darius (with Sheriffs Proof of Service)
02-18-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-19-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Plaintiffs Motion In Limine to
Preclude David Vigos from Testifying About Plaintiffs Mental
Alertness
02-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

(:JJ

02-23-15 Filed: Defendant State of Utahs Proposed Vair Dire of the Jury
Venire
02-23-15 Filed: Exhibit A- Proposed Voir Dire Examination of the Venire
02-23-15 Filed: Exhibit B- Courts Modified Jury Vair Dire Examination of
the Venire
02-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-24-15 Filed: PLAINTIFF PATRICK LILEYS PROPOSED VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY
VENIRE
02-24-15 Filed: Exhibit 1
02-24-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
03-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial
Judge:
Clerk:

JENNIFER A BROWN
raelenec

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS
Plaintiff's Attorney(s):

S

BROOK MILLARD

Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE
JENNIFER D REYES
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENART
Printed: 04/02/15 11:32:45

Page 13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paqe 13 of 22

CASE NUMBER 120600012 ~er~onal Injury
Audio
1

Tape Number:

Tape Count: 9:21

This matter comes before the Court for day one of jury trial.
Court and counsel meet in chambers off the record regarding the
pending motions.

Court makes findings and denies the motion for

summary judgment, denies the motion to preclude testimony of David
Vigos, as to the State's Objections to Plaintiff's pre-tr~al
disclosures the highway patrol report is reserved, affidavit of
Tony Dick is excluded, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with
foundation, photographs of cattle are excluded, Juab County Sheriff
records are excluded, and as to the State's Objections to Cedar
Springs' Ranch pre-trial disclosures the highway patrol report is
reserved, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with foundation
and deposition transcripts are excluded.
TIME: 9:21 AM Jurors are welcomed and thanked for their patience
and appearance.
TIME: 9:25 AM Potential jurors are sworn in.

Voir dire begins.

TIME: 9:43 AM Court takes a brief recess.
TIME: 9:57 AM Voir dire continues in chambers.
TIME: 11:47 AM Court resumes in the court room.

Jurors selected to

serve on the case: 1-2, 2-3, 3-12, 4-13, 5-14, 6-17, 7-18, 8-23 and
9-24.
TIME: 11:50 AM Remaining jurors are thanked and excused.
TIME: 11:50 AM Jurors are seated and given the oath for trial
jurors.
TIME: 11:52 AM Preliminary Instructions are read to the jury by the
Court.
Printed: 04/02/15 11:32:45
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1
2

CASE NO. 120--600012
APPELLATE NO. 20150267
DEPT. NEPHI - DISTRICT

3

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

4

5
6

7

----00000----

PATRICK LILEY,
Plaintiff,

8
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1

becomes theirs;

it's_ their right to take control

2

of that and it's their duty to mai~tain and it-

3

whatnot.

4

not what happens in those situations.

That just simply isn't the case.

That's

And so we still believe that they've

5

6

failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that

7

there was a duty· on behalf of Cedar Springs Ranch

8

to the plaintiff,

9

move for a directed verdict.

and we would ask the Court to

THE COURT:

10

Thanks.

Thank you.

In making this

11

ruling,

12

ruling intended to address anj breach of piercing

13

the corporate veil.

14

of the different corporations that are at issue

15

here,

16

names because I'm sure I would get warm and cedar

17

and springs and creek mixed up.

18

understand the distinction between those~

19

~---•
V

I want to make clear that in no way is my

I understand the difference

._

k~

although I'm hesitant to even try to say the

I certainly do

However, ·the difference here is that

20

while they are distinct legal entities, Mr. Darius

21

is a principal in both.

22

landlord/tenant relationship based upon his own

23

testimony, and I do find that a landlord does have

24

some duty to control the actions of its tenant,

25

and I would say that at least in this case I would

There is a

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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161 South 200 West Cedar City,
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1

think that duty perhaps is slightly greater given

2

the close interrelationship of the parties.
And so unlike the directed verdict for

3

4

UDOT,

I am going to find that there is sufficient

5

competent evidence to go to the jury on the issue

6

of negligence with regard to Cedar Springs Ranch.

7

And I note in makirtg this decision that· there's

8

already been an indication of an intent to.

9

allocate fault to Warm Springs which Cedar Springs

10

still has available to it in this action.

11

I'm going to deny the motion for the directed

12

verdict,

And so

and we'll move forward on that basis.

13

MR. MILLARD:

14

Your Honor, may we deal with one

15

you could let UDOT go, but could we deal with one

16

issue that I

17

and it's with respect to Jury_Instruction No.

18

Instead of stating the defendant Cedar Springs

19

Ranch it has Warm Creek.

20

defendant.

21

and that is the law of the case is that Utah Code

22

41-6-407 applies to this action, and that needs to

23

be corrected.

24
25

Thank you, Your Honor.
wel-1,

I guess

just noted in the jury instructions,
11.

Warm Creek is not a

Plaintiffs made that same allegation,

THE COURT:

I will take a look at that.

Would you like to be heard on that,

Counsel, with
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VERDICT FORM

PATRICK LILEY,

Plaintiff,
vs.

UTAH DEPARTh1ENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, a division of the State
of Utah, WAB COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah, SANPETE
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State
of Utah, CEDAR SPRIN"GS RANCH, INC. a
Utah corporation, and DALE DORIUS, an
individual
.
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Judge Jennifer A Brown

Defendants.
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VERDICT FORM
Members of the jury:
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented.
If you find that the i~sue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence answer
''Yes," if not, answer ''No."
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to all of the required questions, but they need
not be the same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to
each question that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and
advise the bailiff that you have reached a verdict
Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc.
Question (1) - Was Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. at fault? (If you answer "Yes," answer Question

(2). If you answer "no," stop here, have the foreperson sign the verdict form, and advise the

lit Yes

bailiff.

D No

Question (2) - Was Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. 's fault a cause of Patrick Liley's harm? (If you

answer "Yes," answer Question (3). If you answer "no," stop here, have he foreperson sign the
verdict form, and advise the bailiff.)

jBIYes

D No

Warm Creek Ranch, Inc.
Question (3) - Was Warm Creek Ranch, Inc. at fault? (If you answer "Yes," answer Question

(4). If you answer "No," go to the next set ofinstructions.)

•

Yes

~

No

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C.
Question (4)- Was Warm Creek Ranch, Inc.'s ~aultacauseof Patric~ Liley's harm?
(Regardless of your answer, go to the riext'set

of instructions).

D Yes·

D No

Patrick Liley
Question (5) ..:.·was Patrick Liley at fault? (If you answer "Yes,"' B.llSWer Question (6). If you

•

,81Yes

answer ''No," answer Questions 7 and 8)

No·

Question (6) - Was Patrick Liley's fault a cause of his own harm? (If you answer "Yes," answer
Questions 7, 8 and 9.)

•

Jli:TYes

No

Comparative Fault
Question (7) - What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley' s harm is attributable to Cedar
Springs Ranch? (If your answer to either (1) or (2) is ''No," then enter zero.)

_$
...........
,S:_ _%.

Qu~tion (8)- What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley's harm is attributable to Warm
.

..

.

.

.

.

.

.

Creek Ranch? (If your ~werto (3) or (4) is ''No," then enter zero.);

tJ
%
---=----

Question (9) - What per~nt of the fault that caused Patrick Liley' s fuum is attributable to
..

..

...

.

Patrick Liley? (If y~ur answer to (5) or (6) is ''No," then enter zero.) :
The total must equal 100%
.

_,_s:___%
100%

.

If Patrick Liley' s fault is 50% or more, stop here~ have the foreperson· sign the verdict form and

advise the bailiff. If Patrick Liley's fault is less than 50%, answer Question (10). Do not deduct
from the damages any percentage of fault that you have assessed to Patrick Liley. The judge will
make any necessary deductions later.
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Question (10) - What amount fairly compensates Patrick Liley for:
•

Past Medical Expenses

•

Other Economic Damages

$

•

Non-Economic Damages

$

CJ

:z,9,'t.t/0 -~o

Total

When ·six or more of you agreed on the answer to each question that is reqwred to be answered,
your foreperson should sign and date the form and advise the bailiff that you have reached a

verdict.

Sign here
Date

• ~£"j4),
Jury Foreperson
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